Abstrak / Ringkasan
This article offers a philosophical reading of Sufism by positioning ma‘rifah as a form of transformative knowledge that integrates epistemic, ethical, and ontological dimensions. Sufi knowledge is often criticised as subjective, unverifiable, or anti-intellectual because of its close association with inner experience. Against this reduction, this article argues that the Sufi tradition contains an epistemic architecture that can be analysed philosophically. It develops a distinctive relationship between rationality, religious experience, moral virtue, and disciplined self-practice. Using a conceptual-hermeneutic method and a comparative reading of selected works by al-Ghazali and Ibn ‘Arabi, this study employs three philosophical lenses: virtue epistemology, philosophy as a way of life, and the epistemology of religious experience. The analysis shows that, in al-Ghazali, ma‘rifah moves from ‘ilm towards dhawq through tazkiyah and disciplined practice. In Ibn ‘Arabi, ma‘rifah is grounded in the ontology of tajallī, in which the imaginal realm mediates knowledge as a domain of meaning. In both thinkers, knowledge does not stand as a neutral proposition, but functions as an orientation of life that forms the knowing subject. This article concludes that Sufism can be read as a philosophy of knowledge that links truth, virtue, and the restoration of the self, without reducing spiritual experience to psychologism or negating the demands of rationality.